Intersubjectivity in The Light of Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber Essay

Intersubjectivity in The Light of Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber - Essay Example â€Å"the world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world. And Being-in is Being-with Others.†7 So, â€Å"this Being-with Others defines the existence of Man. In Heidegger’s terms, now we know that for Dasein there is no Being without Being-in, and there is no Being-in without Being-with.†8 But what does Being-with mean? â€Å"Being-with must be of the essence of Dasein because without it any kind of relation to Others, even one of love, would not be possible, let alone essential itself.†9 This brings us to the fundamental question – What is Being? Herein is Heidegger’s foundation for intersubjectivity, i.e. the social self: Because Dasein’s Being is Being-with, its understanding of Being already implies the understanding of Others. This understanding, like any understanding, is not an acquaintance derived from knowledge about them, but a primordially existential kind of Being, which, more than any thing else, makes such knowledge and acquaintance possible. Knowing oneself is grounded in Being-with.10 Thus, Heideggerian intersubjectivity is rooted upon Dasein’s encounter of the others, that is to say, that it depends on the intersubjective encounters with other temporal beings. The world by which we share with other temporal beings requires a kind of open subjectivity in order for understanding to take place. But how do we experience intersubjectivity with others? How does Dasein encounter another Dasein? This is what Heidegger calls the principle of individuation: â€Å"the transcendence of the being of Dasein is a distinctive one since in it lies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individuation.†11 So Dasein...In this essay, I will conduct a comparative analysis of two accounts of intersubjectivity. I will show that Heidegger’s account of intersubjectivity is foundational for Buber’s account to take place. To nullify the former, we thus nullify the latter. Hence, the differences in both accounts are but a matter of differing modes of interpretation, due to the complexity of the nature of intersubjectivity. It is easy to dismiss something which one makes no effort to understand. The literature of both Heidegger and Buber were obscure and abstract, yet full of meaning; most of which is left unspoken. Yet isn’t it the case that intersubjectivity is obscure and abstract? Doesn’t dialogue take place when its left unspoken? Herein is where the philosophies of both meet. For, it is in my contention that both philosophers need not differ drastically from each other’s account of intersubjectivity. It is in Heidegger’s account where Buber carries out his. The difference perhaps, if any, lies in its mode of interpretation, which is due to the complexity of the nature of intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, both accounts capture the essence of intersubjectivity, which proves to show how intersu bjective relations takes place. Intersubjectivity involves our awareness of others, the role they play in our lives, and the their significance in our quest for meaning and authenticity.